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531 
“And Should the First be Last?” 
Malcolm D Evans* 
Questions of “Religion and . . .” are prone to generate 
controversy. Consider, for example, the so-called “science and 
religion” debate, focusing on whether science and religion are 
compatible with each other.1 Juxtaposing religion with something 
else immediately tends to summon up a hermeneutic of opposition 
which, rather than facilitating an exploration of the relationship at 
hand, often has the effect of calling into the question the legitimacy 
of there being a relationship at all. Nowhere does this seem to be 
truer than in the context of religion and human rights, where the 
relationship is so often assumed to be one of contradiction, if not of 
outright conflict.2 
From the very outset of its being recognized as a part of the 
canon of international human rights law, the freedom of religion has 
been the subject of a double pressure, both from within and from 
without. From within, it has been under pressure to be aligned with 
freedoms pertaining to non-religious forms of belief.3 The idea that 
 
* Professor of International Law, University of Bristol, UK. This is a lightly reworked text of 
an address given at the Brigham Young University Law & Religion Symposium on October 6, 
2013, and is based in part on a chapter by the author in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (Scott Sheeran & Nigel Rodley eds., 2014). 
 1. For perhaps the most prominent example of this controversy in popular writing, see 
RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2006), which prompted a series of debates and 
responses, including works by ALISTER MCGRATH & JOANNA COLLICUT MCGRATH, THE 
DAWKINS DELUSION?: ATHEIST FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE DENIAL OF THE DIVINE (2007); 
KEITH WARD, WHY THERE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY A GOD: DOUBTING DAWKINS (2008); and 
ALISTER MCGRATH, WHY GOD WON’T GO AWAY: ENGAGING WITH THE NEW ATHEISM 
(2011). 
 2. A tendency not limited to those who speak from a position antithetical to religion: 
see, for example, the intriguingly titled collection of essays, DOES GOD BELIEVE IN HUMAN 
RIGHTS? (Nazila Ghanea, Alan Stephens, & Raphael Walden, eds., 2007). 
 3. This is reflected in the freedom being cast as the freedom of “thought, conscience 
and religion” and that there be protection of manifestations of “religion and belief.” The 
European Court of Human Rights has frequently held that article 9 of the ECHR includes 
non-religious patterns of belief, commenting that “it is a precious asset for . . . .” Kokkinakis v. 
Greece, App. No.14307/88, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 18, ¶ 31 (1993); see also U.N. 
Human Rights Comm., 48th session, Gen. Comment No. 22, Art. 18, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, ¶ 1 (1993). 
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religious belief per se should be the subject of particular protections 
as a human right has never gained particular traction, and as a result, 
the freedom of religion is “internally moderated” by this parallelism 
with other forms of “conscience-freedoms.” This tends to mean that, 
rather than focusing on freedom of religion itself, attention is more 
often focused on the manner in which other human rights ideals—
such as thought, expression, association, equality, and non-
discrimination—find their outworking in the context of religious 
belief and belief systems. 
The external constraint—the “constraint from without”—is the 
view that there is a question mark over the legitimacy of freedom of 
religion being protected as a human right at all. It is quite 
remarkable that many of those who fervently support it, let alone 
those who fervently oppose it, embrace the idea that there is not 
only a right to the freedom of religion but also the mirror-image 
right (nowhere formally articulated) to the “anti-right”: the right to 
be free from religion.4 It is difficult to think of any other “freedom-
right” that has an “anti-right” of this nature associated with it in 
quite this fashion. For example, the freedom of expression is not said 
to imply a right to freedom from expression, or the freedom of 
association a freedom from association, etc.5 
To the extent that this means no one ought to be forced into 
accepting forms of religion or religious practices, this is (or ought to 
be) entirely unexceptional and completely welcome. However, it has 
been taken to mean a great deal more than this and reflects the 
distinctly cool—and sometimes downright hostile—attitudes which 
some (many?) within the human rights community have towards 
religion as a human right. Arguably, this has been of relatively little 
consequence until quite recently, due to the relative lack of 
engagement with freedom of religion by those working within the 
 
 4. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment No. 18 (n. 2) ¶ 2: “[A]rticle 
18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any 
religion or belief.” This is also found in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
See, e.g., Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber), ¶ 60 
(“[A]rticle 9 of the Convention . . . guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
including the freedom not to belong to a religion.”). 
 5. It is, of course, the case that one cannot be forced to express views one does not 
wish to express or associate with people one does not wish to associate with. But this is not the 
same as saying that one has the right to be “free” from “expression” or from “association” in 
the sense of not being “exposed” to expression or association, and this is the claim that is 
indeed sometimes made as regards the freedom “from” religion. 
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field of human rights at all. Following 9/11, however, religion has 
become a more prominent—and increasingly dominant—feature in 
international relations, resulting in a greater politicization of religion 
within the human rights field. Some have responded to this by 
arguing that in order to return to a “safer” and more secure world, it 
is necessary to depoliticize the freedom of religion by returning it to 
the obscurity from whence it came. In short, if, in international 
affairs and in the human rights sphere, “religion is trouble,” then 
“no-religion” is trouble averted. 
There is much that could be said against this approach, but 
perhaps the most telling objection concerns its underlying premise, 
which is that religion is a marginal concept which has attained too 
great a prominence within human rights thinking. From a purely 
historical perspective, this is quite wrong and it is the opposite which 
is the case. Although human rights thinking has become an 
increasingly prominent discourse in international affairs over the last 
sixty years, it is only in the last ten years—twenty at the most—that it 
has taken so central a stage.6 Across this time, the influence of 
religion as an ordering worldview has remained a dominant force, 
and perhaps increasingly so. It is the rise of human rights thinking 
and its implications for religious thinking, rather than the rise of 
religion as a challenge to human rights thinking, that has 
accentuated the debate. In short, it is human rights thinking, not 
religious thinking, that is the “new kid on the block”—something 
that human rights theorists are apt to forget. 
Once again, however, perceiving the relationship in this manner 
smacks of dualism and clashes of right and wrong, which are not 
only unhelpful, but can also become downright dangerous. For 
example, I have been party to many serious discussions in which 
evidence of egregious violations of basic religious rights of believers 
have been countered with examples of situations in which other 
religious believers (of either the same or of other faiths) have not 
been particularly accommodating of the rights of others—perhaps of 
women or of LGBTIs—or have sought to restrict the right of others 
to express themselves through the use of blasphemy laws, etc. It is as 
if it were acceptable to say: “Yes, we know that group X is being 
persecuted for their beliefs. But if we protect group X in the 
 
 6. For a perceptive study of why this might be so, see SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST 
UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010). 
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enjoyment of their religious beliefs, we will be failing to properly 
protect the human rights of others because religious believers do not 
always respect human rights.” Such logical non-sequiturs and 
unproven consequentialism would quickly be rejected in other areas 
of human rights thinking: a State is not generally accused of 
endorsing criminal conduct or of prejudicing the rights of victims of 
crime because of its insistence that those charged with criminal 
offences receive a fair trial. It is all the more strange that there should 
be such a reluctance to protect the rights of religious believers lest it 
be thought that in doing so one is supporting and encouraging their 
beliefs.7 A victim should be seen as a victim—not as a potential 
perpetrator. 
Be that as it may, mutual doubt and hesitation permeate the 
relationship between religion and human rights, and a sense of 
dualism pervades the arena. As a result, for many, human rights must 
be compatible with their faith, whilst for others it is faith that must 
be rendered compatible with human rights. Much of the doctrinal 
work in this area—particularly as regards Islam and human rights—
has focused on how religious belief and human rights can be 
“reconciled” through the reinterpretation of one’s faith, or by 
adhering to strands within one’s faith tradition that accord with 
contemporary human rights standards.8 Yet this process has not only 
involved Islam. I would argue that—although it takes a different 
form and reflects different historical, political, social, and theological 
factors—a similar process is occurring in Europe, focusing on what 
might be called the secularizing of the public space.9 Given the 
 
 7. Nevertheless, this is a trap into which courts also fall from time to time. See, for 
example, the judgment of the Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Mouvement Raelien Suisse v. Switzerland, where it said that “[t]he Court shares the 
Government’s view that acceptance of a poster advertising campaign could suggest that they 
are endorsing, or at least tolerating, the opinions and conduct in question.” Mouvement 
Raelien Suisse v. Switzerland, App. No. 16354/06, ¶ 52 (Jan. 13, 2011), aff’d 2012-IV Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 373. 
 8. Of the many works exploring such approaches from a legal perspective see in 
particular the work of ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: 
NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF SHARI’A (2008) and ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: SELECTED 
ESSAYS OF ADBULLAHI AN-NA’IM (Mashood A. Baderin & Abd Allah Ahmad Naim eds., 
2010). See also MASHOOD A. BADERIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC LAW 
(2003). 
 9. Of the ever-growing literature on this, see, for example, ROGER TRIGG, RELIGION 
IN PUBLIC LIFE: MUST FAITH BE PRIVATIZED? (2007); RELIGION IN A LIBERAL STATE (Gavin 
D’Costa, Malcolm Evans, Tariq Modood, & Julian Rivers eds., 2013); ISLAM AND ENGLISH 
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nature of western Christian doctrine, the so-called debate about the 
role of religion in public life seems to fulfill a function very similar to 
the debate concerning schools of interpretation within Islamic 
thinking. In both, the central issue is not about secularity, neutrality, 
or theological inquiry; it is about forging an approach capable of 
resolving the tensions between religion and human rights. 
Once again, however, we find ourselves drawn back to the 
“religion and . . .” question, which is why both these lines of inquiry, 
and others like them, are ultimately so unsatisfactory. This is not to 
say that they are unhelpful. Such discussions can be profoundly 
helpful in clarifying lines of thinking and the issues that underlie 
them. Yet, they can only assist in addressing the “tension” to the 
extent that those engaged in the discussions concerning, say, the role 
of religion in public life or the acceptability of principles of 
theological interpretation continue to share a sufficiency of common 
space. One has to have agreement on what constitutes the “public” 
as opposed to the “private” sphere; on what falls within the scope of 
public life and what does not;10 on what religious texts are to be 
subject to interpretation of whatever nature; and so on, if these 
processes are to yield fruit. The real problem, then, lies in the 
assumption that ultimately there are limits to the common space 
within which shared discourse can generate positive outcomes. If all 
one is doing is redefining the parameters of the “problem,” one is 
merely relocating the source of future tension, rather than 
identifying a means of addressing it. 
Need it be this way? It is often overlooked that the originators of 
contemporary international human rights thinking—as with so many 
other aspects of international humanitarianism—did not only derive 
inspiration or motivation from their religious beliefs, but also that 
the protection of religious believers originally lay at the heart of the 
enterprise.11 It has also been argued that there is something of the 
 
LAW: RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE PLACE OF SHARI’A (Robin Griffith-Jones ed., 
2013). 
 10. For example, is buying a postage stamp in a state-run post office to be understood as 
a public event? If so, then does the religious clothing worn by the person buying the stamp 
become a matter of legitimate public concern? 
 11. See generally MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN EUROPE (1997). For the interplay between religion and international law more generally,  
see MARK W. JANIS & CAROLYN EVANS, RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2004). 
For an earlier work predating the “human rights” era on this, see NORMAN BENTWICH, THE 
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“religious” about the espousal of human rights,12 which perhaps 
finds some reflection in the contemporary trend towards grounding 
both religion and human rights in the concept of dignity.13 Whatever 
one’s view on this, it does offer a different approach to 
understanding the relationship between religion and human rights. 
Rather than an approach based on identifying a means of 
accommodation that is mutually acceptable to the various camps 
concerned (which also reinforces the sense of there being a 
separation between them, a gulf to cross, a bridge to build), it points 
to an approach founded upon their commonalities. This is not to 
suggest that religion and human rights are, in some sense, the same. 
They are not. But they do share an overlapping function, a shared 
concern with how people are to relate to each other within a 
governed community. The starting point, then, for a useful 
exploration of the relationship between religion and human rights 
begins not with religion, nor with human rights, but with 
recognition of the contribution each makes to that underlying 
common enterprise. That each may seek to do more than that is 
neither here nor there. 
This is not without implications, the most troublesome of which 
might be that it accords legitimacy upon both religion and human 
rights and seeks to understand them as operating within a shared 
space. It has already been mentioned that this is a claim that many in 
religious circles have long denied, and which is still contested by 
some religious believers.14 It is also deeply controversial for many of 
 
RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONALISM: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
THROUGH THE AGES (2d ed. 1959). 
 12. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 11–
42 (1998). 
 13. For a penetrating analysis of this trend, see Christopher McCrudden, Human 
Dignity and the Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655 (2008). 
 14. This debate finds reflection in the more general question of “religious autonomy,” 
and in particular, the autonomy of religious organizations from the application of general legal 
provisions that they consider to be inimical to their religious mission or ethos. Employment 
law has proven to be a particular flashpoint, particularly the application of general employment 
law frameworks to ministers of religion. Approaches to this continue to oscillate, with the 
current trend appearing to be pointing towards enhanced autonomy. See, for example, in the 
United States, the Supreme Court judgment in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); in the United Kingdom, the judgment of the Supreme Court 
in President of the Methodist Conference v. Preston, [2013] UKSC 29; and before the European 
Court of Human Rights, the case of Sindicatul “Påstorul Cel Bun” v. Romania, App. No. 
2330/09, (GC July 9, 2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.c
oe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-122763. See generally Ian Leigh, Balancing 
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a non-religious persuasion who find it difficult to accept the 
rationality or reality of religious belief, and who are not inclined to 
accept any implications of religious legitimacy that might have a 
material bearing upon them. Yet religion and human rights 
demonstrably exist as forces within the shared space of human 
governance. The future lies not in trying to understand the one in 
terms of the other, but in trying to understand each in terms of each 
other: not as forces pulling in opposite directions, but as forces 
directed at a common endeavor (albeit not necessarily always doing so 
in a mutually supportive fashion and neither of which is immune to 
misunderstanding, misapplication or mistake). To borrow and adapt 
a phrase, it involves taking religion and taking (human) rights 
seriously. 
I. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN IN PRACTICE? 
In recent times there has been considerable focus on a number of 
issues in which there is perceived to be a straightforward “clash” 
between the freedom of religion and belief and other rights within 
the human rights framework. I want to briefly introduce a number of 
headline issues that have caused considerable debate and which 
remain ongoing sources of controversy. This will be followed by an 
outline of what might be regarded as baseline issues that, whilst 
arguably more foundational to the experience of rights holders, do 
not seem to be able to gain such traction in the overall debate upon 
the subject as the headline issues. 
A. The Headline Issues 
1. Religion and expression 
The interplay between the freedom of religion and belief and the 
freedom of expression is a matter of enduring contention. Ever since 
the Salman Rushdie affair there has been a tendency to view religion 
as a potential gag on expression, an idea reinforced by some of the 
responses to the infamous “Danish cartoons.”15 On the other hand, 
some religious believers see the freedom of expression as a vehicle for 
 
Religious Autonomy and other Human Rights under the European Convention, 1 OXFORD J.L. 
& RELIGION 109 (2012). 
 15. For a discussion of the Danish cartoons, see Paul Sturges, Limits to Freedom? 
Considerations Arising from the Danish Cartoons Affair, 32 IFLA J. 181, 18–82 (2006). 
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pedalling distressingly hurtful comments or attitudes. So under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, it has become entirely an 
uncontroversial proposition that the exercise of the freedom of 
expression might legitimately embrace imparting “‘information’ or 
‘ideas’ . . . that offend, shock, or disturb the State or any sector of 
the population,”16 whilst “[t]hose who choose to exercise the 
freedom to manifest their religion . . . must tolerate and accept the 
denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by 
others of doctrines hostile to their faith.”17 
As interesting as it is that the balance has been struck in this way, 
the more important point is that, thus put, it is not difficult to see 
why the freedom of religion and/or expression are so often seen as 
“rights in collision,” attracting all the attention that attends such 
clashes of fundamentals. It is perhaps inevitable that matters 
concerning the freedom of expression will attract considerable 
publicity. What is not inevitable, but appears to be commonplace, is 
for these rights to be portrayed as being at odds with each other. 
The European Court of Human Rights has stressed the extent to 
which both rights are foundational to the good of democratic 
societies;18 yet rather than engage with each other on this basis when 
issues arise, the tendency is to seek to resolve them by attempting to 
assert the primacy of one right over the other. This again makes for a 
perfect “religion and . . .” question, with the built-in propensity for 
controversy which it brings. 
2. Religion and symbols 
There can be little doubt that one of the most contentious issues 
to have been raised before the European Court of Human Rights in 
recent times has concerned the presence of religious clothing or 
symbols in the educational arena, with key cases dealing with the 
 
 16. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 49 (1976). 
 17. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 295-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A), ¶ 47 (1994). 
 18. See, e.g., Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 49 (“Freedom of expression 
constitutes one of the essential foundations of [a democratic] society, one of the basic 
conditions for its progress and for the development of every[one].”); See also Kokkinakis v. 
Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 31 (1993) (“[F]reedom of 
thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a ‘democratic society’ within the 
meaning of the Convention.”). 
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wearing of headscarves by students19 and the presence of religious 
symbols in classrooms.20 The Court’s approach currently oscillates 
between focusing upon the potential impact the presence of such 
clothing or religious symbols in state institutions might have upon 
perceptions of the impartiality of the State in matters of religion or 
belief in general, and focusing on the actual impact that the wearing 
or presence of such symbols actually has upon the rights of others. In 
other words, is it their symbolic significance or their practical impact 
that is at the heart of the matter? Put in such terms, it becomes 
clearer that the underlying issue runs even deeper and concerns the 
place of religion in the public life of the society concerned. 
The most significant decision of the European Court on this 
question is without doubt Lautsi v. Italy, in which the Grand 
Chamber unpicked one of its most serious errors of recent times. In 
a string of cases, the Court articulated the proposition that the State, 
when exercising its regulatory powers in respect to religious bodies, 
was to do so in a neutral and impartial fashion.21 This became 
misunderstood to mean that the state was to be neutral in matters 
concerning religion, and thus it was argued that the State ought not 
to be seen lending credence to any particular religion by permitting 
it to be visible within the State. Such reasoning, taken to its limits, 
can lead to bans on members of the public wearing religious clothing 
in public buildings—and possibly in the streets—and is difficult to 
reconcile with the idea that individuals have the right to manifest 
their beliefs in public through observance. The Grand Chamber 
decision in Lautsi pointed to a different approach that could 
conceivably lead in a different direction when it suggested that the 
 
 19. The leading cases remain Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, 2001-V Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 447, and Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 (Grand 
Chamber 2005), which though not entirely ad idem, have both been routinely applied by the 
Court in subsequent cases such as Dogru v. France, App. No. 31645/04, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8 
(2008), and Kervanci v. France, App. No. 31645/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008). 
 20. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber 2011). For a 
series of short explorations of Lausti from a variety of perspectives, see 6 Religion and Human 
Rights 203–285 (2011). See also the collection of essays in THE LAUTSI PAPERS: 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY REFLECTIONS ON RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL 
CLASSROOM (Jeroen Temperman ed., 2013). 
 21. The leading case on this remains Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, App. No. 
45701/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 123 (2001). For an examination of this approach see 
Malcolm Evans & Peter Petkoff, A Separation of Convenience? The Concept of Neutrality in the 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 36 RELIGION, STATE & SOC’Y 205 
(2008). 
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obligation upon States to be neutral and impartial does not 
necessarily require the public realm—in this case, a public school 
room—to be “free” of religion.22 It remains to be seen whether this 
does or does not result in a recalibration of the symbols debate. But 
once again, this illustrates the propensity for the issues concerning 
the relationship between “religion and . . .” (in this case, in the final 
analysis, public life) to achieve prominence in public and in rights-
based discourse. 
Since Lautsi there has also been Eweida v. United Kingdom,23 
which may or may not yet again have altered the parameters within 
which balances may be struck. This is not a question that needs to be 
pursued here. What is important is that this remains the basic 
approach––working out what lies with the State and what lies with 
the European Court when determining where the balance is to be 
struck, couched in terms of neutrality (however understood). 
B. The Baseline Issues 
Some issues relating to the freedom of religion, however, do not 
seem to attract the same degree of attention as issues concerning 
films, books, clothes, and symbols. Recent influential studies have 
pointed to a clear correlation between those countries in which there 
are significant governmental and social restrictions upon the freedom 
of religion and high levels of religious persecution and conflict.24 As 
reflected in the title of the well-known book by Brian Grim and 
Roger Finke, there is a price to pay for denying religious freedom.25 
If one looks at the subject matter of the case law of the European 
Court, one of the recurring issues concerns the denial of legal 
registration to many religious communities that are then unable to 
 
 22. This flows both from its reasoning in Lausti, App. No. 30814/06 Euro. Ct. H.R. at 
¶¶ 60, 69, and from the more general result, which was to see the presence of such symbols as 
falling within the margin of appreciation of the state. 
 23. Eweida v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, & 
36516/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber) (joining four extremely contentious UK 
domestic decisions). For comment on Eweida, see Megan Pearson, Article 9 at a Crossroads: 
Interface Before and After Eweida, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 580 (2013); Mark Hill, Religious 
Symbolism and Conscientious Objection in the Workplace: An Evaluation of Strasbourg’s 
Judgment in Eweida and Others v. United Kingdom, 15 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 191 (2013). 
 24. See Brian J. Grim, Religion, Law and Social Conflict in the 21st Century: Findings 
from Sociological Research, 1 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 249 (2012). 
 25. BRIAN J. GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS 
PERSECUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011). 
DO NOT DELETE 7/10/2015  12:02 PM 
531 “And Should the First be Last?” 
 541 
own property or assert their rights as a community.26 Others find 
their meetings disrupted and their members intimidated or 
arrested.27 In other words, some of the most fundamental aspects of 
the freedom of religion are violated on a routine basis. Yet the 
presence of international human rights law does not appear to be a 
particularly powerful counter foil to this. Although there have now 
been many judgments by the European Court of Human Rights on 
matters concerning registration of religious communities and the 
need to respect the internal autonomy and property of religious 
institutions, recent trends in legislation within numerous Council of 
Europe member States have been towards imposing further 
restrictions upon religious communities and religious believers rather 
than lifting them.28 The force of human rights thinking is not 
noticeably blunting the edge of violence in the sphere of religion or 
belief. 
We need not pursue this thought further here. All that needs to 
be noted is that all these violations—and very serious violations—are 
not about the “freedom of religion and . . .” anything else at all. 
There is no juxtaposition or clash of rights. There may be multiple 
breaches—such as violations of the freedom of association, 
expression, family life, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, 
or the right to life—but no “clashes.” In any realistic scale of 
categorization these are, in fact, just about the enjoyment of the 
freedom of religion or belief. Yet, perhaps this alone is just not 
enough to attract attention, or protection of the right itself? 
 
 26. See, e.g., Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, App. No. 
45701/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R.; Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, App. No. 
72881/01, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.; Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, App. No. 
18147/02, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R.; Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. 
Austria, App. No. 40825/98, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R.; Kimlya and Others v. Russia, App. Nos. 
76836/01 and 32782/03, 2009-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.; Lang v. Austria, App. No. 28648/03, 
2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 27. See, e.g., 97 Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and 
Others v. Georgia, App. No. 71156/01, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R.; Öllinger v. Austria, App. No. 
76900/01, 2006-IX Eur. Ct. H.R.; Sergey Kuznetsov v. Russia, App. No. 10877/04, 2008 
Eur. Ct. H.R.; Milanovic v. Serbia, App. No. 44614/07, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
 28. See, for example, the critical reaction to the new Hungarian Constitution, which 
entered into force in January 2012. According to an editorial in The Times entitled Back to 
Autocracy, the Constitution “attempts to reimpose state regulation of religion by reducing the 
number of acknowledged faiths and sects from 300 to 14 while denying any official place in 
society for Muslim, Buddhist or Hindu congregations unless they have operated in Hungary 
for at least 20 years.” Sam Coates & Roland Watson, Back to Autocracy, THE TIMES, Jan. 2, 
2012, at 2. 
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In the face of a rising tide of concern, the relative failure of the 
machinery of international human rights protection to effectively 
engage with the problems revealed has resulted in increased pressure 
to address issues through political channels. There has been a 
notable increase in the interest shown to freedom of religion issues 
by the European Parliament and other organs of the EU29 and by 
the Parliamentary Council of Europe.30 Likewise, there is increased 
mobilization at the national level—the United States has long been 
in the vanguard here, with the USCIRF, recently joined by Canada, 
the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom.31 If some of the 
most fundamental problems concerning the enjoyment of the 
freedom of religion are not more energetically engaged in by the 
machinery of the international human rights networks, there is every 
likelihood that there may be a further politicization of a relationship 
that is already highly—some might say dangerously—politicized. The 
“solution” to these baseline problems is rapidly slipping through the 
fingers of the organs of the international human rights community 
who continue to obsess with minutiae: Will Rome burn while 
Strasburg fiddles? 
C. A Unifying Role of Respect? 
Against this background, is there really a positive contribution 
that can be made by viewing the interrelationship between religion 
and human rights in a more holistic, mutually reflexive fashion, as 
was suggested earlier? Certainly, a positive contribution is unlikely to 
flow from a continuation of the ultimately sterile debates concerning 
the primacy of one body of thinking, whether it be religious or 
human rights, over the other. Nor is it likely to come from seeking 
to identify a series of lowest common denominators on which both 
 
 29. See generally RONAN MCCREA, RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (2010). 
 30. See, e.g., Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1987, ¶ 1.4 (2011) on 
“Combating all forms of discrimination based on religion” (adopted November 25, 2011), 
which evidences some dissatisfaction in the efficacy of the legal approaches, by asking that the 
committee of ministers, “when supervising the execution of judgments of the European Court 
of Human Rights concerning freedom of religion, notably those concerning registration of 
religious communities and acts of violence based on religion, strive to ensure their speedy 
execution.” 
 31. For an overview, see An Orphaned Right: A Report of the All Party Parliamentary 
Group on International Religious Freedom, (2013), [hereinafter An Orphaned Right], available 
at https://freedomdeclared.org/media/Article-18-An-Orphaned-Right.pdf. 
DO NOT DELETE 7/10/2015  12:02 PM 
531 “And Should the First be Last?” 
 543 
religious adherents and/or human rights advocates can agree. Nor, 
indeed, is it going to come from the endless discussion of the 
meaning of neutrality and—I am afraid to say—models of Church-
State relations (important though all these are in their own way). 
It is, then, not a question of choosing, negotiating, or deciding 
upon the nature of the relationship between religion and human 
rights. Understandings and approaches change within religious and 
within human rights thinking, and there is never going to be a fixed 
and stable answer to the question of the relationship between them. 
To seek to do so is to be aiming at an ever-moving target. Rather, 
one needs to step back and seek to better understand the key 
components of religion as a human right and then, bearing this in 
mind, seek out the principles that should govern religion’s 
interaction with other rights. This will not indicate what those 
outcomes will be, and will certainly not ensure that there is a 
consensus for those outcomes when they are decided upon. But it 
should make it possible to find an approach to the protection of 
religion as a human right, which coheres with human rights thinking 
and that transcends the “either/or,” or “the religion and . . .” 
questions that have become so dominant and so damaging. Such an 
approach will not remove all tensions—it cannot—but it can address 
many of the tensions that are the artificial product of the 
inappropriate manner in which they are currently addressed. 
This may not be as difficult as is seems. It remains instructive that 
in the first cases to be determined by the European Court of Human 
Rights concerning the interplay between religion and expression, the 
Court swiftly identified a value that is not mentioned in either article 
9 or in article 10, but which it thought offered a lens through which 
to consider the question: the lens of mutual “respect.” As the Court 
put it, “a State may legitimately consider it necessary to take 
measures aimed at repressing certain forms of conduct, including the 
imparting of information and ideas, judged incompatible with the 
respect for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of 
others.”32 The key points emerging from the Court’s approach to 
the intersection of the freedom of religion and the freedom of 
expression are that both rights are of value and should be enjoyed to 
 
 32. Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 18, ¶ 48 
(1993); see also Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 295-A Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A), ¶ 47 (1994). 
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the fullest extent possible without negatively impacting the 
enjoyment of the rights of others. Mutual respect for the rights of 
others regarding what is said and how it is said might suggest that 
restraint would be welcome; but it is not for the State to be the 
instrument of restraint unless there is a pressing social need to do so. 
The value of this approach has recently been affirmed by the U.N. 
Human Rights Committee in its latest General Comment No. 34 on 
the freedom of expression.33 
There are lessons to be learned from the approaches adopted by 
the European Court in this body of jurisprudence that are relevant to 
other questions concerning the enjoyment of the freedom of religion 
or belief as a part of the canon of human rights law: does the subject 
matter of the contestation and of the outcomes the parties are 
seeking to achieve evidence a mutuality of respect rather than an 
assertion of right? Or—in simple language—just because you can 
does not mean that you should? And is this not what balancing is, 
ultimately, all about? It should be made clear that respect, in this 
context, does not imply endorsement of, let alone agreement with, 
the beliefs in question. Indeed, it may well be that a respectful 
consideration will nevertheless result in the rejection of some 
viewpoints as being simply unworthy of respect within the human 
rights framework.34 It will certainly mean that some views will be 
responded to (and respected) in a way others might find unwelcome. 
Nevertheless, a respect-based approach to rights has already emerged 
in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and 
may well be worth exploring further as a means of meeting the 
challenges we face. 
The only thing I would insist upon is that we really have to do 
something. It is both instructive and salutary to re-read the history of 
the founding moments of the current human rights regime in the 
 
 33. See U.N. Human Rights Committee, 102d Sess., Gen. Comment No. 34 at 12, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011) (“Prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for 
a religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are incompatible with the 
Covenant.”) (emphasis added). 
 34. See, for example, the decision of the Court in Norwood v. The United Kingdom, 
App. No. 23131/03, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., and the Chamber judgment in Mouvement 
Raelien Suisse v. Switzerland, App. No. 16354/06, ¶ 61 (Jan. 13, 2011), aff’d 2012-IV Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 373, in which the Court went out of its way to hold open (though not decide) the 
question of whether Raelian beliefs were to be considered within the scope of article 9 (though 
the grounds for its hesitation are kept opaque). The Grand Chamber too avoided passing 
comment on this issue (2012-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 373, ¶ 80). 
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1940s. What shines through that history is the keen understanding 
of the need to ensure adequate protection for religious freedoms if 
the world were to be made a better, safer place.35 Yet, to use the 
words of the recent report by UK parliamentarians, it has become 
the “orphaned right”36 within that system—or at best a “residual 
right”—its content determined by what is left when other rights have 
been realized. Tragically, we are seeing the consequences—and I 
would indeed suggest that respect might be able to assist us in 
making sense of the human rights approach to the freedom of 
religion today, and assist in making the human rights approach more 
relevant to the problems that it needs to address. 
  
 
 35. See, for example, the illuminating narrative based on the work of Eleanor Roosevelt 
in MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2001), in which the significance of the freedom of 
religion or belief is highlighted in a manner lacking in some of the more textually oriented 
analyses, e.g., JOHANNES MORSINK, ‘THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
ORIGINS, DRAFTING AND INTENT (1999). 
 36. An Orphaned Right, supra note 31. 
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